

Colonial Histories and Decolonial Dreams in the Ecuadorean Amazon

Natural Resources and the Politics of Post-Neoliberalism

by
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The political changes sweeping Latin America have inspired scholars to declare a “post-neoliberal” era, some even suggesting a potential reversal of colonialism. Despite progressive political discourse in Ecuador, the indigenous movement continues to resist the state. Underlying the conflict between the indigenous and the state is a long-standing conflict between economic growth and the environment. Since Ecuador’s economy relies on Amazonian natural resources, the post-neoliberal Ecuadorean state requires colonial advances into indigenous territory to fund its progressive social programs. The opposite of colonialism is autonomy, which in the right hands can represent a true development alternative.

Los cambios políticos arrasando América Latina han inspirado a los académicos a declarar una era “posneoliberal,” algunos incluso sugiriendo una inversión potencial de colonialismo. A pesar del discurso político progresista en el Ecuador, el movimiento indígena continúa resistiendo el Estado. Detrás del conflicto entre los indígenas y el Estado es un conflicto antiguo entre el crecimiento económico y el medio ambiente. Como la economía de Ecuador se basa en los recursos naturales de la Amazonía, el Estado ecuatoriano posneoliberal requiere avances coloniales en territorio indígena para financiar sus programas sociales progresistas. Lo contrario del colonialismo es la autonomía, que en las manos adecuadas puede representar una verdadera alternativa de desarrollo.

Keywords: Sustainable development, Extractive industries, Colonialism, Indigenous movements, Plurinational autonomy

On a bus in Quito, passengers listen to a radio advertisement strategically deploying the voice of an indigenous woman to extol the virtues of the president’s latest policies, part of the socialism of the twenty-first century brought by the Citizens’ Revolution. The benefits of this socialism are communicated everywhere: in shiny, beautifully shot posters and television addresses from the president himself. President Rafael Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution indexes a shift in world politics that some are calling “post-neoliberalism.” While Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia are considered the primary leftist block in

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South America, leftward-leaning shifts in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru have brought sweeping political transformations. Scholars analyzing post-neoliberalism imply that these changes, however varied, are a response to the failure of neoliberal development models initiated in the 1980s, which subsequently deepened poverty (Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg, 2009; Castañeda, 2006; Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009). Mario Blaser (2007) has gone so far as to argue that the current crisis of legitimacy reflects not only 30 years of neoliberalism but also 500 years of hegemony since the conquest. It would be hasty, however, to declare both those crises resolved. Widespread resistance to the state continues in Amazonian indigenous communities despite the post-neoliberal turn. Exploring this resistance unpacks key dilemmas and contradictions shared throughout the developing world.

Regardless of their differences, the neoliberal right and the post-neoliberal left share an approach to development that relies on growth. The illusion of “cornucopianism,” based in part on the “liberal democratic ideal that social justice is predicated on economic growth and expansion” (Mathai, 2012: 88), is broken by a closer look at those who must bear the externalities of extractive development. Decades of ethnographic work with marginalized communities have led post-development scholars like Arturo Escobar to seek an era in which the “centrality of development as an organizing principle of social life would no longer hold” (2000: 11). Interpreting political discourse, Escobar (2010) sees the post-neoliberal moment in Latin America as a crossroads in which post-development is possible.

Proposals from indigenous groups are distinct from those of the post-development anthropologists who study them. Franklin Sharpe, a Shuar leader in the Amazon, recently explained: “Academics start with theory and then try to work reality into it; we start with reality and then build theory.” Indigenous proposals for plurinational autonomy are therefore theoretically distinct but have strong affinities with practical approaches, emphasizing livelihoods and capabilities, that reclaim the concept of development.¹ These livelihoods and the natural resources connected to them are central to the tension between the indigenous and the state. Building on previous critiques that argue that post-development scholars privilege discourse over livelihoods (Bebbington, 2000), this article traces socioeconomic transformations throughout Ecuador’s colonial history and present. The goal is to explore what colonial threads remain in Ecuador’s post-neoliberal politics and what alternative possibilities are being proposed. In this regard, I spoke with a wide range of Ecuadorean social movement leaders, particularly indigenous peoples in the Amazon, to see how they read the Citizens’ Revolution of the new left. Throughout much of 2011, I conducted interviews to better understand Amazonian resistance to Correa’s administration. I traveled throughout the Amazon and spoke with leaders of communities, members of the Indigenous Parliament, and presidents of federations. I shadowed the members of the Amazonian indigenous federation as community leaders debated and negotiated positions on policy, and I met with leaders working at the national level.

Ecuador’s indigenous movement and its positions are heterogeneous. The powerful movement seen in Ecuador today emerged when self-governing Amazonian communities came together to form federations, which later

founded the interethnic Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Amazonia Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorean Amazon—CONFENIAE)² in 1980. Joining with the federation of the sierra and a third federation on the coast, it established the national-scale Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador—CONAIE) in 1986. In addition, an Indigenous Parliament passes laws for indigenous communities on the national level (Becker, 2008). All of this is done in the absence of state funds, using occasional project money from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local bank loans.³ Positions have shifted over geography and time, in part because of efforts at co-optation by the state and multinational corporations inflected within local divisions. There are patterns in these conflicts, particularly with different stances between Amazonian groups in the semiurbanized, colonized parts of the Amazon and those living in the rain forest.⁴

This article brings ethnographic observations over the past decade, systematic interviews with social movement leaders, and historical analysis to bear on the problem of colonialism in post-neoliberal Ecuador. In order to identify colonial and decolonial⁵ threads in the politics of the present, the following two sections chart Ecuador's political ecology since before the conquest from the perspective of the Fourth World. The subsequent section outlines the emergence of the post-neoliberal turn and continued indigenous experience of colonial, extractive development. Government approaches to the social and environmental dilemmas posed by extractive development are explored in the section that follows. Building on the previous sections, the article then outlines the differences between the development imaginaries of the state and those of the indigenous, posed as a plurinational alternative. The conclusion asks what role the state and indigenous movements might have in effecting a truly decolonial turn.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FOURTH WORLD

In 2008 I attended a community meeting in the northern Amazon in which an environmental organization reported the discouraging results of its biochemical analysis of the local river system: essentially there was no potable water. A litany of testimonies ensued from the community members gathered: cancer, oozing sores, miscarriages. "As we speak, my mother is vomiting blood while she also bleeds profusely from her vagina," a Shuar leader shared. Food insecurity caused by the roads and refineries long ago gave rise to crime, common in petroleum-rich areas, prompting month-long annual paramilitary *limpizas* (cleansings) in which prostitutes, homeless children, and gays were executed in the night hours. The disturbing social relations of the present are the culmination of a long history of colonization.

Colonialism is best understood by examining the underlying elements of its various forms throughout history. Fanon's (1963: 106) observations on development in the colonial context still apply long after the colonial era: "Colonialism almost never exploits the entire country. It is content with extracting natural resources and exporting them to the metropolitan industries thereby enabling

a specific sector to grow relatively wealthy, while the rest of the colony continues, or rather sinks, into underdevelopment and poverty." At the heart of the problem of colonialism are transformations in social and economic organization intimately tied to the extraction of natural resources from peripheral communities. The roots of this process go back even before the conquest.

The anthropologist Pierre Clastres (1998) argues that the formation of the state (or empire) is at its core the establishment of coercive hierarchies conjoined with extractive production. Societies that anthropologists would later call "primitive" can be viewed as engaged in a sustained effort to evade the "civilization" of the state in order to maintain controls on hierarchy and continue subsistence livelihoods. When the Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro arrived in what is now Ecuador, the Incan Emperor Huayna Capac had just a few decades earlier completed his own conquest of the Ecuadorean highlands, held tenuously with the marriage of his son Atahualpa to a Quito princess (Ayala, 1988–1990; Hemming, 1970). In the Amazon, the Incan Empire had met with even greater resistance. Clastres (1998) indicates that some Amazonian tribes were originally escapees of the Mayan and Incan empires, abandoning the hierarchies of empire-driven fixed-field agriculture for subsistence livelihoods in the rain forest under more egalitarian forms of leadership. Amazonian tribes, escapees or not, relied upon mobility and violent resistance in order to evade integration into the Incan Empire. For Clastres, it is the political encroachment of the state that produces the dramatic elimination of "primitive" lifestyles.

The term "Fourth World," popularized by the Shuswap Chief George Manuel, is typically meant to refer to the territories inhabited by indigenous peoples that operate subsistence or traditional economies, what others might mistakenly call "primitive." This is not to say that subsistence economies are inherently indigenous (both Caucasian communes and indigenous palm plantations can be found in Ecuador), but the concept of a Fourth World enables us to trace the expansion of the market economy into indigenous territory in the Amazon. In contrast to the world system, with its market economy, the Fourth World tends to be dominated by what Karl Polanyi (1957) calls "reciprocal economic systems," central to what Wallerstein (1974) calls "mini-systems." State building, be it indigenous or colonial, neoliberal or post-neoliberal, is predicated on the forcible transformation of local reciprocal economies to regional or global economies that benefit some at the expense of others.

Ecuador's history is one of political-economic transformations designed to bring local natural resources into global, Euro-American markets characterized by a turbulent series of booms and busts. When Francisco Pizarro took the region in 1532, a colonial gold rush ensued. Colonists transformed highland social organization throughout the Andes, relying on indigenous slave labor for their gold mines and haciendas. The erosion of the mercantilist system in the 1700s resulted in an expansion of trade and thus the expansion of haciendas, incorporating even more of the indigenous population into an extractive economy that caused mass starvation. The subsequent depression improved conditions for the poor as Spanish colonists abandoned their land and indigenous peoples returned to subsistence economies (Mahoney, 2010).

A growing Euro-American demand for chocolate brought Ecuador's first boom. Along the waterways and new roads, Fourth World economies were replaced by Third World international markets from the 1860s to the 1920s. The rise of a new mestizo elite and their cacao haciendas along the coast led to Eloy Alfaro's Liberal Revolution, placing the state squarely in the hands of coastal oligarchs (Guerrero, 1980; Larrea and North, 1997; Striffler, 2002). When disease and international competition brought the bust of the 1920s, minor elites were forced to secure popular legitimacy, and the popular classes gained increased influence over political agendas. Hegemonic tranquility gave way to decades of political struggle with the Julian Revolution, initiated by low-ranking military; the government changed hands 20 times in 20 years. Meanwhile, farmworkers escaped the terrible working conditions of the haciendas and formed hundreds of communes (Striffler, 2002).

In the 1940s, a network of roads constructed by United Fruit (later known as Chiquita) and Standard Fruit (later known as Dole) completed the colonization of the coast. The threat of violence and imprisonment was used to maintain plantation labor. International competition coupled with widespread peasant invasions ultimately expelled the company. The elites weakened, and a military junta headed by Rear Admiral Ramón Castro Jijón brought an end to the oligarchic democracy in 1963 and implemented agrarian reform (Larrea and North, 1997; Striffler, 2002).

A review of this history reveals a relationship between colonialism and growth. Ecuador's booms were fueled by the expansion of colonial plantations and haciendas into indigenous territory where subsistence economies had predominated. The booms enabled elite oligarchies to commandeer state control at the expense of the poor. The busts, in turn, provided the poor with the opportunity to recover some economic autonomy and push for mild reforms at the state level. The transformations, however, left a permanent mark with each expansion. Predicated upon economic productivity, Castro's agrarian reform forced landowners to rely on exports over subsistence. Without capital, most smallholders lost their land and were forced to work for larger contractors under terrible conditions, ultimately selling bananas to the same multinationals the workers had worked so hard to escape (Larrea and North, 1997; Striffler, 2002).

With the highlands colonized by the Spanish and the coast colonized by multinational agribusiness, Ecuador's third boom colonized the northern Amazon. Texaco's 1967 discovery of oil in the northern Amazon invaded previously autonomous territory. Ecuador's gross national product tripled within a few years, while Texaco funded various presidential campaigns with its profits. Until 1984 Texaco operated with no oversight, playing an authoritative role within the government (McAteer, Cerretti, and Ali, 2008).

RESOURCE FRONTIERS

Tito Puanchir, as the president of CONFENIAE, travels extensively across the country between remote villages and urban centers. He lives a long walk along a trail into the forest in a district known as "La Shell." The municipality's

emblem is Shell Oil's, modified to include a pearl, following its motto, "The pearl of the Amazon." I interviewed him in 2011 in La Shell's municipal park, overlooking a monument that consists of an airplane (modeled after that flown by missionaries) positioned atop the steel tower of a petroleum well. Puanchir's father had been a missionary. He recounted many tales of colonization, but that of the Wadani⁶ was the best documented. Their story enables us to unpack the colonial underpinnings of the current foundation of Ecuador's economy: oil.

Initial incursions into the jungle by petroleum companies met with failure. Workers disappeared in the night; others were found dead, killed by lances and spears. Mestizo workers refused to work in the rain forest out of fear. Instead, petroleum companies employed the Inca-descended Kichwa (Colleoni and Proaño, 2010). As Puanchir recounts, this was not a situation limited to Wao territory. The Shuar and Achuar defended their territory from the petroleum companies as well; like the Wadani's, their skills were honed by continual clan warfare. In the 1950s the Summer Institute for Linguistics (SIL) succeeded where the Inca, the Spanish, and the Ecuadorean state had failed. Missionaries set out to contact the Amazonian Wadani using the infrastructure from Shell's prospecting activities in the region. The Wadani were a collection of distinct, albeit linguistically similar, clans at war with each other and outsiders in defense of their territory. Operating under the auspices of the SIL and supported by the Ecuadorean government and petroleum companies, the missionary Laura Saint was successful in converting many of the Wadani clans to Christianity. The pacification of the Wadani ended the war between the tribes but also prepared the region for petroleum activity (Cabodevilla, 1999; Colleoni and Proaño, 2010).

A series of petroleum companies came to work in Wao territory: Texaco, Conoco, Repsol, and Maxus. Ewenguime Enkeri, chief of the Wadani, delivered an impassioned speech to a government tribunal asked to approve the environmental license for yet another company, Petrobras, to operate in the territory in 2008 (Colleoni and Proaño, 2010: 14–15):

They [missionaries and petroleum companies] make civilization; they take us, all of the Wadani, and put us in only one zone, piled up there, to exterminate the Wadani, kill the Wadani. . . . Damn Maxus. Yes, I can say this. They had their anthropologists, they said we were their children, to tell you what Maxus said. They allied themselves with the Wadani there, everyone friends. They convinced even me. . . The Wadani signed an agreement. We signed, blindly.

The Wadani did not receive the university and hospital that Maxus promised; instead, they broke into factions. Experiences like theirs can be found throughout the Amazon. As Sawyer (2004) recounts in her investigation of ARCO, when petroleum companies are not able to secure agreement from indigenous leaders, they create and legitimize factions out of portions of the community that are willing to allow petroleum activity. My interviewees report that these divisions turn violent, with killings between rival indigenous organizations occurring in Sucumbíos, where PetroEcuador now operates Texaco's former oilfields.

Lago Agrio, the center of Texaco's operations, was appropriately named after Texaco's home city, Sour Lake, Texas. Sawyer (2004: 101) explains:

The burning off of crude led to the phenomenon of “black rain”—what some indigenous people called the “bleeding of the skies” with hydrocarbon soot. . . . Researchers estimate that Texaco’s operations generated up to 4.3 million gallons of hazardous waste daily over a period of twenty years. Between 1972 and 1990 the Texaco-operated Trans-Andean pipeline spilled an estimated 16.8 million gallons of crude into Amazonian headwaters—over one and a half times the amount spilled by the *Exxon Valdez*.

With the new petro-funded infrastructure in place, the government homesteaded the Amazon under agrarian reform, relocating poor people from the highlands by colonizing Amazonian indigenous territory (McAteer, Cerretti, and Ali, 2008). In 1972 President Guillermo Rodríguez Lara delivered a speech about development initiatives in the Amazon. When asked about the indigenous displaced by the colonization that followed the roads, he replied, “There is no more Indian problem. We all become white men when we accept the goals of the national culture” (Whitten, 1976: 12). By the late 1980s a CONFENIAE spokesperson indicated that 600,000 Záparo and 30,000 Tetete had been eliminated; of the 60,000 Wadani who were living before oil development began only 2,500 survived (Cabodevilla, 1997: 16). Oral histories recount that environmental damage from roads, pollution, and colonization eliminated subsistence-based food security. Employment constructing roads and refineries was short-lived. Ultimately, the better formal-sector jobs were occupied by mestizos, leaving the indigenous to struggle to survive on the margins of the frontier economy, often resorting to begging, crime, and child prostitution. Government policy from the 1950s to the mid-1990s ignored indigenous rights to ancestral territory, considering the land “unoccupied” and facilitating massive displacements.

Today, the transition from a reciprocal economy to a market economy utilizes a combination of force and incentives. “Very deep in the rain forest [*adentro*], you almost don’t see money at all; we don’t completely know how the economy works,” Puanchir explains. “When settlers come with money, we sell everything. First we sell all our livestock, then all our trees. Finally we sell the land itself. We are left with nothing.” Many indigenous people are initially excited to have roads, to sell their homes and to take temporary construction jobs, imagining a modernized city life, but oral histories of the Amazon’s developed regions indicate that those hopes rarely materialize. By the mid-1990s, in contrast to the one-third of Ecuadoreans below the poverty line nationally, two-thirds of rural Amazonians lived in poverty (World Bank, 1996). While some community members living in the rain forest are in favor of roads, members and leaders who have the benefit of seeing what has occurred elsewhere in the Amazon are more critical. In the words of a Shuar leader, “In the rain forest, we have our own economy. With enough to eat, you don’t have to go rob. You don’t have to prostitute yourself; there are no drugs. You live happily.”

One of the pernicious characteristics of market economies, according to Polanyi, is that they are “disembedded” from nature and local contexts. Insular reciprocal economies operated within local ecological and social boundaries; the transition to an extractive market economy leaves local ecologies devastated and local populations without food security. This is not to imply that Amazonian subsistence economies are perfectly sustainable. Indigenous

leaders acknowledge that population growth requires them to clear increasing tracts of forest; Puanchir recounts that this is experienced in familial conflicts when parents attempt to divide their land between their children's families.

While biologists and anthropologists have worked hard to debunk the myth that indigenous people are inherently ecological (see Krech, 1999, and countless works on the "noble savage"), it is important to understand ecological effects in relative terms. The market economy facilitates ecological destruction on a much larger scale; subsistence and semisubsistence livelihoods that rely on produce from small local farms leave an infinitely smaller ecological footprint (Rees and Wackernagle, 1994) than urban livelihoods that are maintained by distant timber concessions, petroleum blocks, banana plantations, and cattle ranches. It is precisely this economic and ecological reordering—from subsistence to extractive, from reciprocal to market, from mini-system to world system—that the colonial state initiated and that extractive development, be it neoliberal or post-neoliberal, would complete.⁷ In order to chart genuinely decolonial possibilities, we must explore the basis for the post-neoliberal rupture and its challenges for resolving the dilemma of extractive development.

A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN AN OIL REPUBLIC

Discontent with neoliberalism is strong in Amazonian communities. During my first visit to the Amazon in 2000, 14-year-old indigenous prostitutes greeted us as we carried my friend Galo, representative of the Siona people, into the emergency room. Our truck, carrying 20 indigenous leaders from throughout the Amazon who had come to learn to monitor the environmental effects of petroleum, had been crushed by an out-of-control petroleum crane the size of a building. Despite our protests, Galo was left unattended in the emergency room, half-conscious, arms flailing as he gargled, spitting up his own blood; it was mestizo and foreign petroleum workers that the clinic was accustomed to treating. Excluded from employment, health, and food security, indigenous peoples saw few of the benefits of petroleum development. Under the neoliberal model of that time, neither did the poor throughout the country. Post-neoliberalism can be viewed as part of a history driven by these contradictions.

Ecuador's military dictatorship relinquished power in 1979, but the return to democracy coincided with a shift to highly unpopular neoliberal policies at the urging of the United States. Ecuadorean products became more competitive on the world market, but local wages plummeted. Reversing the import-substitution instituted by the military, neoliberal export-led development and International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank policies ultimately brought unprecedented levels of inequality; by the 1990s Ecuador's wealthiest quintile received three-quarters of the nation's total income, poverty levels were nearing 50 percent, and health and social programs were drastically reduced (Clark, 1997; Larrea and North, 1997).

Entrepreneurs in a globalized economy entered into relationships with the U.S. companies that enjoyed the majority of benefits of the economic transformation. Consequently, the perception of the United States as an imperial power pervaded and continues to pervade school textbooks, news, and political

rhetoric in Ecuador. Lushi Yanqui concerts feature beating a life-sized doll of Uncle Sam with a bat and lighting him on fire; graffiti in Quito read “Be a patriot, kill a gringo.” Neoliberalism’s crisis escalated in 2000 when President Mahuad dollarized the economy in the midst of an economic crisis brought on by corrupt bankers and IMF-mandated structural adjustment. The indigenous movement mobilized an enormous march on the Presidential Palace. With the help of the military, CONAIE ousted the president and took control of the state for three days (Gerlach, 2003). Social movements later banded together to support the election of President Gutiérrez, who proceeded to implement a neoliberal agenda; social movements and the military then removed him. Since the “return to democracy” in 1979, social movements objecting to neoliberal agendas, with the support of the military, have repeatedly removed the president, only to replace one neoliberal agenda with another.

In 2006 the economist Rafael Correa was elected president, marking Ecuador’s entry into the post-neoliberal block. His party, Alianza PAIS (later called Acuerdo PAIS), emerged out of the Jubilee 2000 movement focused on freeing Ecuador from its international debt. Correa immediately audited the debt, refusing to acknowledge fraudulent loans taken by past dictators, and expelled the World Bank representative. The bankers who had caused the crisis in 2000 had their assets seized, pensions for the poor were increased, and a massive public works program began. A popular mandate for an alternative to neoliberalism had been brewing for decades; deft political maneuvering and advantageous conditions made these changes politically feasible. Because petroleum companies are no longer discovering new reserves, growth for the world’s remaining petroleum companies is now predicated on competition for state-held contracts for existing reserves. After a series of negotiations, Correa dramatically increased Ecuador’s percentage of production-sharing agreements. Soaring oil prices and renegotiated contracts provided Correa’s administration with an immediate windfall to spend on infrastructure, education, and public relations. With the United States occupied by its own domestic economic crisis and two long-lasting wars (Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg, 2009), Chinese, Canadian, Brazilian and a wide range of other investors were available to take the place of U.S. companies, thus enabling Ecuador’s government to leverage alternative investment options in negotiations with companies in multiple sectors. Following Correa’s election, Chinese investment in Ecuador doubled; by 2007 China was investing more in Ecuador than in any other Latin American country (Ellis, 2008).

Ecuador immediately repositioned itself within the world system, challenging U.S. imperialism. President Correa’s administration ended its relationship with the U.S. petroleum company EDC, closed the controversial U.S. military base in Manta, severed military ties with the former School of the Americas, and expelled the U.S. ambassador after the WikiLeaks scandal. Refusing to sign the U.S.-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas, Correa instead joined the Venezuela-backed Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas—ALBA), which has created an international currency called the sucre to broker exchanges between South American and Caribbean countries. Domestically, the government doubled the percentage of the gross domestic product spent on health care and social programs.

The administration expanded public works, most notably in education and infrastructure. However, rural areas—home to the resources that fuel the Ecuadorean economy—did not see the same reductions in poverty as urban ones (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2009).

The shift in trade partners and social programs of post-neoliberalism are clear reversals of the Washington Consensus, but are they decolonial? Ecuador's repeated revolutions have deferred more than resolved the contradictions of indigenous exploitation. Alfaro's Liberal Revolution deployed the discourse of indigenous rights only to draw indigenous workers from highland haciendas to new masters on coastal plantations. The Julian Revolution deployed agrarian reform under conditions that drove smallholders into exploitative relationships with multinationals. For indigenous peoples in the Amazon, will the Citizens' Revolution be any different? Correa's relations with the indigenous movement soured quickly. A year into his tenure, residents of the town of Dayuma in Ecuador's Yasuní National Park took control of several Chinese-owned oil wells demanding environmental protections and development outcomes for Amazonian peoples. Correa responded with violent military repression, inciting both domestic and international criticism. He publicly admonished what he called "infantile" environmentalists and unpatriotic saboteurs for obstructing development, and 45 activists were jailed on charges of terrorism (Becker, 2011a; Ellis, 2008).

By 2013 Correa's government had taken out US\$9 billion in loans from China, nearly doubling Ecuador's total debt (Gill, 2013), largely in order to build roads and hydroelectric dams. According to bank transfers exposed by José Cléver Jiménez Cabrera, an Amazonian representative to the National Assembly, Correa's government was paying the interest on those loans with oil sold at a highly unfavorable rate. Ecuador, Jiménez told me, had merely replaced one form of imperialism with another.

China wasn't the indigenous movement's only concern. In 2010 the presidents of Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia met with other South American representatives in Otavalo, Ecuador, to discuss indigenous rights within ALBA. Outside the meeting, CONAIE protested the exclusion of indigenous representatives from the meeting. ALBA invokes the memory of the beloved Simón Bolívar in the promotion of trade. In a subsequent interview the president of CONAIE, Marlon Santi, noted: "Bolívar liberated Latin America only to copy the colonialists, leaving intact a system which exploited indigenous peoples. . . . The 'socialism' proposed by Rafael Correa, like the right-wing projects that preceded it, does not take indigenous peoples into account" (Webber, 2010).

In contrast to analyses that look only at the formal economy, the actual indigenous experience of globalization outlined in the previous sections is one of territorial loss and food insecurity as subsistence economies are eliminated in areas that fuel each economic boom. CONAIE fears that artisanal livelihoods will become threatened and indigenous peoples will be forced to work in factories supplying regional markets. As transnational companies penetrate Ecuadorean markets for clothing and food, local artisanal producers in the reciprocal economy will not be able to compete. While trade regionalization and diversification may have geopolitical advantages, they enroll increasing amounts of indigenous territory into colonial relationships with the metropole.

The same petroleum scarcity that has brought the recent boom for the Ecuadorean government heralds a bust around the corner. With less than a decade and a half of oil remaining in northern Ecuador, the state's gaze has turned to the reserves of gold, copper, silver, and molybdenum in the untapped southern Amazon. Environmental groups report concessions at a pace surpassing that of Correa's neoliberal predecessors, largely to Chinese and Canadian mining companies. Many of these companies have poor reputations for social responsibility, preferring to bribe local officials, the police, and the military. When two bribed community leaders signed a mining agreement against the wishes of their community, village elders determined that they should have hot peppers placed in their eyes and inhale smoke until they vomited before being exiled. That may not stop the mine; leverage for indigenous groups and transnational NGOs confronting investors from an increasingly wide range of countries is increasingly limited.

Record-high oil prices temporarily dipped in 2009, forcing Correa to take out US\$1 billion in loans from China, while negotiating with Chinese investors over a US\$1.7 billion copper mine deep in the southern Amazon (*New York Times*, March 13, 2012). In Correa's words: "We know that mining is necessary for modern life. As well as the raw materials, we need the revenue so that we can care for handicapped people, pay for social security, build roads" (Garcia and Valencia, 2012). José Cléver Jiménez, who represents the region in the National Assembly, recently assured me that the opposition is strong. The Shuar and Achuar communities are prepared to resist with blockades and spears. "When the mines come, it's going to be a civil war down there," Puanchir cautioned.

COLONIALISM, CONSERVATION, AND DEVELOPMENT IN A PETRO-STATE

The contest over development in the Amazon, the primary source of Ecuador's formal economy, is central to Ecuador's future. As outlined above, post-neoliberalism, like its predecessors, enrolls increasing amounts of Amazonian indigenous territory into the global economic networks that finance its policies. Post-neoliberal Ecuador is faced with a dilemma: social programs require taxable formal-sector profits, but those profits are primarily derived from the environmental destruction of the Amazon. Various strategies have been deployed to address this problem: conservation, regulation, nationalization, and development.

In 2007, then-Minister of Energy and Mines Dr. Alberto Acosta advanced a proposal to Correa from civil society. The ITT-Yasuní project would collect money from international donors in exchange for a commitment from the Ecuadorean government not to approve oil incursions into the Yasuní National Forest. One of the most biodiverse places in the world, the Yasuní is also home to the two remaining uncontacted Wadani clans (Oilwatch, 2007). A groundbreaking plan, the ITT project is a potential model for conservation policy around the world. However, without territorial autonomy, the area remains at risk of both licit and illicit incursions from mining, timber, and guerrilla-funded

drug activities. One of the founding members of Correa's Alianza PAIS, Acosta was subsequently elected to preside over the Constituent Assembly, which addressed conservation with provisions to designate portions of the Amazon as protected forests in a new constitution (Becker, 2011a). However, his more progressive stances on the constitution-making process put him in conflict with Correa and ultimately resulted in his resignation in 2008 (de la Torre, 2010).

After Acosta left the administration, Correa's government failed to acquire the target funds for the ITT program. Correa advanced a plan to exploit the formerly protected Yasuní and the territory of uncontacted tribes, engaging in an enormous public relations battle with environmental and indigenous groups. Acosta launched a critique of Correa's administration, including its indigenous rights policy, calling into question the president's commitment to the constitution. Support for the new constitution had been tepid among indigenous leaders, who felt that substantial demands were left unaddressed.

I discussed Correa's implementation of the constitutional reforms with the leadership and staff of the Federación de Organizaciones de la Nacionalidad Kichwa de Sucumbíos del Ecuador (FONAKISE), the Kichwa Federation of Sucumbíos, in the northern Amazon, where territory has been designated as protected forest. Mining and road building are legal in protected forests but farming is not. Remote indigenous communities that do not follow politics were surprised by the arrival of the military on their land indicating that they could no longer continue their livelihoods. CONFENIAE reports similar cases throughout the Amazon.

A more common strategy for addressing development's ecological debt to marginalized people is through the redistribution of petroleum profits. By 2008 conditions had not greatly improved in the northern Amazon since my visit in 2000, in which Galo was hospitalized. His face scarred for life, Galo remained highly critical of the private companies. He had become the leader of his Siona village; members of his community had been recruited to take part in a landmark lawsuit against Texaco for the damage done to the Amazon and the people who live there. Such lawsuits face tremendous resistance from both well-financed corporations and their allies within the government. With limited resources for legal battles, the vast majority of damage by private companies goes unaddressed. Emergildo Criollo, leader of the Cofán and member of the Unión de Afectados y Afectadas por las Operaciones Petroleras de Texaco (Union of Those Affected by the Petroleum Operations of Texaco—UDAPT), told me that he had discovered his name mysteriously placed on another defendant's drug-trafficking case in the Ecuadorean courts when he tried to travel to the United States to campaign for his organization's legal battle with ChevronTexaco. In fact, he reported that many of the claimants named in the case against ChevronTexaco have been accused of crimes including terrorism and were initially barred from traveling to testify on the case being brought in their name. CONAIE has been monitoring the criminalization of its movement. Bartholo Ushigua of CONAIE reports that Correa's administration has accused 189 indigenous movement leaders of "sabotage and terrorism." When three Amazonian protesters were killed by police in a protest against water privatization, CONAIE's current vice president was charged with their murders.

Corporate responsibility remains unrealized, but the nationalization of the petroleum industry has also failed to produce adequate accountability. As PetroEcuador's resources increase, its accountability decreases. It is now the majority partner in all contracts, and communities have been prohibited from negotiating independently with companies. Grievances and renegotiations must now be brought to government ministries or PetroEcuador; public works are conducted exclusively by government agencies. In the petroleum-rich province of Sucumbíos, Paco Chuje, the president of FONAKISE, explained: "Before, petroleum companies delivered about 60 percent of what they had promised in their agreements with the community. Now, the government delivers nothing. I don't know where the money has gone."

Correa is strategic with the dispersal of his petroleum windfall. Provincial authorities I interviewed indicate that he has delivered resources to municipal and provincial governments that are loyal to him and financially paralyzed those where opposition parties dominate. According to the historian Marc Becker (2011b: 182), Correa stopped funding for the Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador (Development Council of the Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador—CONDENPE) in direct retaliation for indigenous resistance to his development agenda. The end of this indigenous-run agency further isolated the indigenous movement from any control over development. Meanwhile, indigenous leaders claim that the remaining development agency, the Instituto para el Ecodesarrollo Regional Amazónico (Institute for Eco-development in the Amazonian Region—ECORAE), has been politicized. The administration of ECORAE funds holds an understandable allure for some leaders, particularly in light of the destitution of indigenous governments. A product of traditional indigenous governance outside the state and economy, CONFENIAE struggles to acquire the meager bus fare to bring the leaders of its member organizations to its meetings. Puanchir's predecessor, José Aviles, acquired funds under the table from the state and petroleum companies and used them to purchase alliances with Amazonian leaders until he was forcibly ejected for corruption in 2006. Over a year after his expulsion, Aviles was still being flown to international conferences claiming to speak as the leader of the Amazonian indigenous in defense of Ecuacorriente's mining operation in the southern Amazon, where he denounced indigenous protesters as being manipulated by Canadian NGOs.

The situation is complex. ECORAE programs such as state-controlled education and state-controlled roads may seem less invasive and perhaps needed in places where the mines have already come. Roads built to extract resources and schools built to indoctrinate may also link people to employment and services. The handful of indigenous communities that have allied themselves with the government receive public works while those who oppose trade regionalization, road building in the rain forest, and mining policies are left without any funds to administer at all. Financial support comes at the price of abandoning not only an alliance with those in the interior who resist encroachment but factions of their own communities pushing for environmental justice. This has created fissures in the front for indigenous rights and fueled heated divisions both between and within Amazonian groups; interclan rivalries over the administration of state funds within the nationalities have turned violent in

both the northern and the southern Amazon. These factions clash angrily with those who see an alternative future for indigenous people. CONAIE, CONFENAIE, and the Indigenous Parliament continue to attempt to assuage these conflicts in constructing a consensus around a common position: plurinational autonomy.

DECOLONIAL DREAMS

To understand resistance to ECORAE's development model and the hope invested in plurinational autonomy, it is worth reflecting on why and how development has failed the Amazonian indigenous population of Ecuador. The brief history recounted here reveals not only contradictions within neoliberal logic but continuities between colonial, neoliberal, and post-neoliberal political ecologies. The economic transformations brought by colonization and the subsequent cacao, banana, and petroleum booms have had long-lasting effects as they geographically expanded the reach of the state and the global economy. Local livelihoods in colonized areas now depend on export economies and state bureaucracies in place of subsistence and sustainability. Politically, economic booms have facilitated elite control over governance; development has facilitated disenfranchisement. These are the problems that a decolonial turn would need to confront.

The neoliberal turn of the 1980s accelerated the colonial reach of international markets and the state into the Amazon. Privileging the formal economy and blind to transformations in livelihoods, the neoliberal approach has largely failed Ecuador; however, neoliberalism alone did not generate these inequalities. Export-led development had already been perniciously transforming Ecuador's ecological, political, and economic landscape for hundreds of years, and it continues to do so in post-neoliberal Ecuador. Post-neoliberalism is not Ecuador's first leftward turn. The OPEC embargo brought record oil profits to Ecuador, enabling the left-leaning military regimes of the 1970s to finance the import-substitution industrialization advocated by dependency theorists to subsidize national industries producing goods that would replace imports, as well as education and a wide array of social welfare programs. By the end of the 1970s infant mortality had dropped 40 percent and 10 years had been added to the average life expectancy (Clark, 1997). At the same time, groups like the Záparo, Tetete, and Wadani suffered nearly genocidal loss of life along with illness, hunger, and violence in the regions that supplied the state's windfall.

Correa's administration has improved infrastructure, roads, hospitals, and education in Ecuador's heavily populated urban centers, but those improvements were funded by the colonization, exploitation, and environmental destruction of the Amazon. This is rationalized by convincingly revolutionary discourse. The Citizens' Revolution is invoked in posters, radio advertisements, and television. ALBA is trade built on "human solidarity"; Chinese and Venezuelan mining companies are part of an "anti-imperial" economic plan. "We cannot be beggars sitting on a bag of gold," Correa announced in response to indigenous protests. Correa's radio addresses frame what he calls "infantile" indigenous resistance to his mining agenda as part of a right-wing conspiracy

by U.S.-allied NGOs to unseat him. “Correa is like a father whose adolescent son hates him,” a leftward-leaning mestizo explained: “What he does, he does out of love.” CONAIE’s Ushigua describes the consequences of Correa’s discourse: “It was easier dealing with right-wing governments. Everyone knew what they stood for. This government is much more complicated. When we make demands, they say ‘We did that already,’ because their discourse is to claim they’ve done things for the indigenous.” Many indigenous leaders claim that Correa’s rhetoric obscures the administration’s underlying colonialism.

The infrastructure that the state is willing to fund in the Amazon facilitates an extractive agenda. An indigenous leader from Pastaza summarizes: “For us, the roads bring poverty.” This strategic move is a product of both the world system and the structure of modern democracy: a tyranny of the majority in densely populated urban areas over the sparsely populated but geographically vast Amazon. Ultimately, the redistributive benefits of the Citizens’ Revolution rely on a colonial extraction of value from the Amazon. Franklin Sharpe, leader of the Pitirishka community, explains the contrast between the indigenous proposal and the work done by ECORAE: “All of this will work in the mestizo sector, not in the indigenous sector. Our proposal is not just for national development but for *plurinational* development.” The importance of indigenous influence over infrastructure and economic development is clear, but control over education is also critical. The Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe (National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education—DINEIB) was historically under the control of CONAIE until it became clear that its educational approach was anti-mining. Correa wrested control from CONAIE and placed DINEIB under the Ministry of Education, where state administrators could orient education for nationalist purposes (Becker, 2011b).

In contrast, indigenous leaders advocate local autonomy: each nationality could develop curricula that combine Western science and history with their own ancestral knowledge. Following this proposal, local histories, medicine, and ecological knowledge would not only be preserved but advance with time. Ushigua explains: “We don’t just want to learn the mestizo history, we want to learn our histories, and each of our histories is different.” Amazonian histories are usually passed down orally; thus children in the urban and semi-urban areas with public schooling are left with a significantly different worldview from those who live in the rain forest. The contrast is best conveyed in an example. Tito Puanchir’s son Yang shared his English lesson with me: “The Inca civilization was a model of social organization. Everyone, from the emperor at the top to the farmer at the bottom, knew his place in society and the work he was expected to do.” The implication is that the Ecuadorean indigenous laborer should also know his place and do his work. Yang is of Shuar and Amazonian Kichwa descent. His ancestors fought to defend their territory against the hierarchies of the Incan Empire; however, those same hierarchies are valorized in his English lesson. The communities deeper in the Amazon, farther away from state education and infrastructure, are those that continue to resist most passionately. Their alternative histories are central to imagining alternative futures.

As a result of intense efforts by the indigenous movement, Ecuador’s constitution made reference to plurinationalism and *sumak kawsay* (living well)

(Becker, 2011a), meant to refer to the indigenous goal of harmonious interpersonal, communal, and environmental relations. This was the first constitution in Latin America to mention indigenous concepts of development. However, Becker (2011a: 56) notes, "it is easier to make minor cultural concessions than to create more inclusive social and economic systems." Indigenous groups pursue plurinational development within their own means. CONFENIAE representatives showed me a document outlining their process for achieving *sumak kawsay*. Alternative futures are outlined in *planes de vida* (life plans) developed by communities. While subsistence lifestyles are preferable to colonization, they entail serious hardships. Indigenous experience informs an "autodiagnosis" that is then honed in community meetings. From there the plan is outlined logistically. In place of economic growth, the plan focuses on *sumak allpa* (territory and environment), *runakuna kawsay* (political economy and basic services), and *sacha runa yachay* (ancestral knowledge, alternative technologies, and education) as indicators.

The possibilities are still in the process of being explored and developed. Puanchir takes me to a North American biologist who invented a low-tech toilet that returns urine into the ground and generates sterile fertilizer from human feces. We discuss alternative ways of spatially organizing agricultural communities and potential sources of funds for solar panels. Other leaders have developed involved eco-tourism proposals as an economic alternative to mining and are discussing ways to mitigate the cultural and ecological damage from tourism.

The development aspirations of plurinational autonomy remain largely unrealized; it is an agenda that is still being defined. Plurinationalism represents hope: an alternative vision for the future that is a central driving force for the indigenous movement. As bulldozers arrive in the Amazon to build the roads that will bring the Chinese and Canadian mines of Ecuador's next economic boom, indigenous communities prepare blockades at great personal risk because they believe that decolonial dreams are worth defending.

CONCLUSION

Blaser's (2007) assertion that today's crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of 500 years of hegemony since the conquest is an astute observation. However, this crisis is neither new nor resolved. Neither neoliberalism nor colonialism has ever been legitimate in the eyes of the colonized. Tracking transformations in peripheral livelihood systems, the current post-neoliberal turn appears as a shift in rhetorical discourse attempting to legitimate not the end of colonialism but the transition from one colonial clientele to another (de la Torre, 2010). The politics of the left and the right are predicated on an overstated dichotomy between the state and the economy. Viewed from the Fourth World, however, they have much in common. Post-neoliberalism is certainly not anticapitalist, and neoliberalism is clearly state-dependent. The state, as shown above, relies upon an expanding, transnational formal economy to secure resources; economic growth relies upon the state to facilitate colonial expansion into indigenous territory. While there are certainly differences between statist and

neoliberal approaches to governance, neither approach adequately addresses the underlying process of extractive development and socioeconomic transformation that perpetuates social inequality and environmental destruction.

Bringing these colonial continuities to light should not obscure the very real differences between the left and the right. Things have improved dramatically in Ecuador's urban centers since my first visit during the economic crisis of 2000. Correa has expertly deployed trade diversification to maneuver Ecuador out from under U.S. hegemonic control. He has severed military ties with the former School of the Americas. He has expelled the World Bank representative, negotiated fiercely with Western petroleum companies, and used some of the resulting funds to help the urban poor. Unfortunately, this has not slowed the process of colonialism. The current leftward turn, like the previous leftward turns of the 1960s and 1970s, has used favorable oil prices to implement reforms to support the poor. The ALBA of 2010, like the import-substitution industrialization of the 1970s, addresses international imbalances in the relations of trade. However, it still facilitates the penetration of the reciprocal economies and ecologies of the Fourth World by ecologically disembedded market economies tied to the nation-state system. The colonial center may have shifted since the days of the Incan Empire, but the metropolitan extraction of natural resources from the periphery continues today. Whether Incan emperors, international businessmen, Ecuadorean elites, urban consumers, or leftward-leaning governments fuel the extraction of value from the Amazon, the result is the same: poverty and environmental distress for Amazonian indigenous peoples (see Bunker, 1985). Colonialism apparently does not require an empire.

The failure of the post-neoliberal turn to reverse colonial trajectories begets larger questions. Can the state function without the extraction of value from its own internal periphery? This question has serious implications for both social justice and environmental sustainability. Does a solution involve negotiation with the state to acquire resources for education and development (as issue editors Veronica Silva and Franklin Ramírez suggest [personal communication, May 1, 2012]), funds from NGOs for development programs, funds from private companies, or autonomy from outside funds altogether? The fundamental contradiction outlined in this article is that state resources, no matter how nobly disbursed, depend upon formal-sector growth, and extractive-industry growth comes at a dire cost for communities at the point of extraction and dire long-term consequences for us all. As Ecuador's petroleum runs out, the state turns to copper and gold in the southern Amazon, but what happens when those reserves run out as well? In Zamora Chinchipe and Morona Santiago, indigenous groups are armed with spears and not pleased with the coming mines. Extractive development is not inevitable. In August 2011 Tito Puanchir led a delegation from CONFENAIE to the First Amazonian Summit on Indigenous Knowledge in Manaus, Brazil, where indigenous organizations from nine countries penned the Manaus Mandate. Criticizing state projects deeply embedded in the world economy, they demand: "We only ask that they let us work in peace in our mission." The state's absence may be as important as its presence.

The opposite of colonialism is autonomy, not just political autonomy but the economic and educational autonomy necessary for indigenous populations to pursue alternative development trajectories, free of the dependencies generated

between the core and the periphery. A strong participatory framework combined with knowledge of the international political economy is particularly critical: Sawyer and Gomez's (2008) review of case studies throughout the world demonstrates that while political autonomy opens new possibilities in some places, it can also bring vulnerability to predatory economic interests in others. The debate is not a simple one. In Ecuador, indigenous leaders past and present have been torn between the narratives of exploitation brought by their neighbors and the promise of money from incoming investors. Some indigenous factions believe that extractive capitalism and state intervention are the best way forward; before Tito Puanchir's tenure, those interests led CONFENIAE. After Puanchir's term ended, the tension between these interests resulted in a new agenda that pro-petroleum factions hoped would gradually edge the organization away from its activist roots, one reimagining CONFENIAE with a more administrative title: the Gobierno de las Nacionalidades Originarias de la Amazonía (Government of the Original Nations of the Amazon—GONOAE).

A sign by a road in the Amazon built with Chinese funds reads: "The Citizens' Revolution is achieved through public works." As we discuss Escobar's (2012) aforementioned crossroads—between (1) social and economic "alternatives to those that have dominated the continent for most of its history" that are nonetheless rooted in modernity and (2) more comprehensive alternatives to Western modernity—another crossroads is being constructed with Eastern funds to extract copper and gold from indigenous territory. Commendably, Escobar's post-development school has attuned academics to the multiplicity of development possibilities, but perhaps the crux of this crossroads is better understood not in terms of modernity but in terms of the extractive economics of colonialism. The plurinational autonomy outlined here is distinct from the post-development school's indexing of philosophical and semantic positions that most indigenous movements do not share. Anthropological approaches that would keep indigenous culture static and locked in a chapter of a textbook have long dichotomized the traditional and the modern, generating an uneasy relationship with development, be it driven by the World Bank, grassroots NGOs, or indigenous groups themselves. While post-development scholars value plurinationality, the word has a different meaning for Amazonian leaders who must confront the challenges of rural poverty. Escobar's (2000: 11) "post-development era, one in which the centrality of development as an organizing principle of social life would no longer hold," is distinct from the plurinational approach of Ecuador's indigenous movement, which does not oppose development or modernity but seeks to control and define them.

Many Ecuadorean indigenous peoples do not see a conflict between development and cultural preservation. Ancestral knowledge has never been static and is therefore "modern" in its own right. Indigenous groups want control over their education systems in order to develop ancestral knowledge further, building on both Western and traditional knowledge, developed by indigenous teachers and administrators with indigenous interests at heart. They welcome modernist scientists and engineers monitoring environmental damage, implementing new technologies for waste management, and researching sustainable energy systems guided by social well-being in place of economic interest. They propose to design a development trajectory that allows subsistence livelihoods to continue and improve. They seek to develop new ways to interact with

external markets that minimize environmental damage. They are open to negotiated outcomes that may be only partially decolonial.

Development approaches from the left, the right, and the post-development schools of thought ultimately constrain and subsume possibilities for the future. Autonomy may lead to a variety of both positive and negative outcomes, but in the right hands it can represent a true development alternative. In order to resolve what O'Connor (1996) calls the second contradiction of capitalism—a world economy pitted against its own ecological foundation—we need to go outside prevailing academic approaches and incorporate indigenous ideas on development. We need theoretical schools of thought that open possibilities for sustainable, plurinational development trajectories.

There is no one indigenous proposition, but factions of the indigenous movement driven by the interests of those in the interior have some very exciting ideas. Their position stems not only from the desire to build on their existing knowledge and cultural forms but from a position of economic, political, and environmental vulnerability within a colonial state. Throughout the Amazon, indigenous communities have organized community-wide assemblies to discuss their life plans: attempting to reinvent education and development in their communities. The future of these plans is still uncertain. This is a work in progress. Indigenous groups do not have all of the solutions to these problems, but with the combination of autonomy and resources they would be in an excellent position to develop them.

NOTES

1. Amartya Sen's capability approach and the livelihoods framework used by applied anthropologists and NGOs radically transform the metrics that orient development.

2. Now the *Gobierno de las Nacionalidades Originarias de la Amazonía* (Government of the Original Nations of the Amazon).

3. NGO programs are piecemeal and are generally do not fund projects that would advance CONFENIAE's own agenda. The funds do not allow the organization to cover overhead and critical costs such as providing indigenous leaders from the interior the bus and boat fare needed to arrive at meetings; something akin to small business loans were taken from the Bank of Pichincha, leaving the organization in debt. The lack of funding for operating expenses was resolved in the past with corruption.

4. The principal fissure is between pro-government and pro-autonomy factions of the indigenous movement; many of the pro-autonomy factions live in the rain forest.

5. The academic use of the term "decolonial" as opposed to "postcolonial" emphasizes the fact that colonialism continues today as well as the agency of colonized peoples in reversing colonialism. Its use is more common in indigenous discourse.

6. "Wadani" is the local spelling used, since the Wao language does not include the letter "r." "Waorani" and "Haorani" are spellings that are usually used in the literature on the groups. The Summer Institute of Linguistics missionary Laura Saint made contact with the Guikitairi, Piyemoiri, Baiwairi, and Wepeiri; the Tagaeiri and Taromenane clans have not yet been contacted.

7. The idea that indigenous inhabitants pose ecological threats has facilitated indigenous displacement across the globe while facilitating far more destructive mining and timber activity.

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